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THE PERILS OF PARADOXES-COMMENT ON WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, "EXPLORING THE KOZINSKI PARADOX:
WHY IS MORE EFFICIENT REGULATION A
TAKING OF PROPERTY?"
VICKI BEEN*

Professor Fischel has provided several interesting insights about takings theory, especially in his discussion of the per se rule for physical
I want to focus
takings and his criticisms of "regulation chopping."'
here, however, only on his analysis of the paradox he believes is posed by
Judge Kozinski's holding in Hall v. City of Santa Barbara.2 The paradox, Professor Fischel argues, is that a mobile home rent control regulation could be an unconstitutional taking, 3 even though other forms of
rent control uniformly have survived takings challenges, because mobile
home rent control is more efficient than other rent controls.
Professor Fischel's analysis of this paradox of "improved efficiency"
leads him to conclude that judges should not find a regulation to be a
taking, even if that regulation is unfair, unless the regulation is "too efficient."'4 The courts should see themselves as only one of the guardians of
individual rights, and should hesitate to step in to protect such rights
when one of the other guardians, such as the legislative branch, has a
comparative advantage at doing so. 5 Professor Fischel argues that if an
unfair regulation is "too efficient," however, judicial intervention is warranted because such a regulation imposes its burdens so narrowly that its
unfairness will never be corrected in a political system based upon majority preferences.
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* Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank
Lewis Komhauser, Richard Revesz, and Jody Rosen for their helpful comments on an earlier draft,
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at the New York University School of Law.
I. William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a
Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 865 (1991).
2. 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988).
3. Hall did not hold that the mobile home rent control ordinance was in fact an unconstitutional taking, but only that it might be, depending upon the proof adduced at trial. The trial court
granted the City's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, so the court
of appeals had no facts before it, and could hold only as a matter of law that the facts alleged in the
complaint, if proved, would constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Hall,
833 F.2d at 1270, 1274, 1282.
4. Fischel, supra note 1, at 866, 887.
5. Id. at 889-91.
6. Id. at 893.
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I agree with Professor Fischel that the takings inquiry should focus,
at least in part, on the ability of the property owner to protect himself or
herself in the political arena. That was the theme of my article "Exit" as
a Constraint on Land Use Exactions.7 I disagree, however, with each
step of Professor Fischel's argument that what he calls "comparative"
efficiency 8 is a useful measure of that ability.
First, the paradox of "improved efficiency" that serves as the rhetorical anchor for Professor Fischel's argument has little to do with traditional notions of efficiency, and accordingly is confusing. Second, his
argument that mobile home park rent controls are comparatively more
efficient than regular rent controls overlooks the potential for capitalization in regular rent control. Third, even if mobile home park rent control is comparatively more efficient than regular rent control, it does not
follow that the political process is less likely to protect mobile home park
owners' rights than landlords' rights. Professor Fischel's assertion that
mobile home park owners have no "hope of political influence to recoup
some reciprocal gains in the future" takes a much too simplistic view of
local politics. 9 Finally, I argue that using efficiency as a proxy for failures in the political process makes no sense given the availability of exit
and voice as direct measures of the ability of the regulated to protect
themselves against majoritarian excess.
PROFESSOR FISCHEL'S DEFINITION OF "EFFICIENCY"

Let me start by exploring what Professor Fischel means when he
says that the courts should not strike down a regulation under the Fifth
Amendment unless the regulation is "too efficient." He cannot mean
that a regulation that is Pareto optimal or Kaldor-Hicks efficient ° is necessarily a "stronger candidate" for a judicial determination that the regulation effects a taking.1 1 If, for example, a mobile home park rent control
ordinance did no more than address the potential for strategic behavior
by the landlord, 12 and was designed so that it just prevented landlords
7. Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991).
8. Fischel, supra note 1, at 876.
9. Id. at 893.
10. An ordinance would be Pareto optimal if it were impossible to move to any other state of
affairs without making at least one person worse off than she was under the ordinance. See EcONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW

at xii (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975). An ordinance

would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it would create a sufficient benefit that the winners under the
measure could compensate the losers (regardless of whether the winners do, in fact, pay such compensation). See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (3d ed. 1986).
11. Fischel, supra note 1, at 867, 911.
12. As Professor Fischel acknowledges, because the cost of transporting a mobile home to a
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from appropriating the quasi-rent created by the tenant's lack of mobility,1 3 the regulation would certainly be Kaldor-Hicks efficient,'

4

but

nothing in Professor Fischel's argument would suggest that it should
therefore be considered a taking.
Nor can he mean that a regulation which is Pareto superior to another regulation is necessarily more likely to be a taking.15 Mobile home
park rent control can't be deemed Pareto superior or Pareto inferior to
regular rent control: different tenants, landlords and other groups are
affected by the two kinds of regulation, and therefore no Pareto comparison can be made. One mobile home park rent control regulation could
be Pareto superior to another such regulation, of course, but it would be
nonsensical to argue that if ordinance A leaves mobile home park owners
better off, and no one else worse off, than ordinance B, the Pareto superior ordinance could be considered a taking, even if the Pareto inferior
ordinance is not. Similarly, if ordinance A left tenants better off, but park
owners and the rest of the world no worse off, than ordinance B, Professor Fischel's analysis does not suggest any reason that the Pareto superior ordinance should be considered a taking. A Pareto superior
regulation is suspiciously efficient under Professor Fischel's scheme,
then, only when ordinance A leaves the same tenants and landlords no
worse off, but the rest of the world better off, than ordinance B.
Professor Fischel's claim that "certain efficient regulatory transfers" 1 6 are stronger candidates for being found to be takings than inefficient transfers thus does not use the concept of efficiency in the
traditional sense of Pareto optimality, Pareto superiority, or KaldorHicks efficiency. Instead, it relies on a notion of "comparative" efficiency. A regulation is "too efficient" in a "comparative sense," according to Professor Fischel, when it results in less deadweight loss-when it
park site is fairly large, the mobile home park owner may be tempted to try to "hold up" existing
tenants by charging them higher rents than the landlord could charge a new tenant who had not yet
incurred the cost of transporting a coach to the site. Fischel, supra note 1, at 870-71. See also

Werner Z. Hirsch, An Inquiry into Effects of Mobile Home Park Rent Control, 24 J. URB. ECON. 212,
216-17 (1988).
13. The capitalization studies on which Professor Fischel relies disclaimed any ability to refute
the possibility that part of the increased value of coaches in rent-controlled parks may result from
tenants taking back quasi-rents that would otherwise be appropriated by park owners. Hirsch, supra
note 12, at 224.
14. Because the winners under the measure - the tenants - could compensate the losers the park owners - out of the tenants' gain, the regulation would be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. See
supra note 10.
15. Ordinance A would be Pareto superior to ordinance B if at least one person believes herself
better off under A and no one believes herself worse off. See ECONOMiC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 10, at xi.

16. Fischel, supra note 1, at 866.
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imposes costs on fewer people or groups of people, or fewer costs on the
same people or groups-than the regulation to which it is being
compared.
THE COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF MOBILE HOME RENT CONTROLS

In deciding that mobile home park rent control is comparatively efficient, Professor Fischel analyzes four socially undesirable results of rent
control: below market rates of return will lead to suboptimal investment
in rental housing; landlords will reduce their expenditures on maintenance; landlords will pull out of the rental market by converting their
units to non-controlled uses; and tenants will hold on to rent controlled
apartments longer than they otherwise would.
Professor Fischel regards mobile home park rent control as no better or worse than other forms of rent control regarding the first inefficiency; the below market rate of return allowed under mobile home rent
control will discourage entry of new mobile home parks, just as regular
rent control discourages entry of new apartments. But, Professor Fischel
argues, the second inefficiency, undermaintenance, will not be as serious
a problem (although it will still exist) in the context of mobile home rent
control. The owners of the mobile homes can capitalize the land's rental
value above the regulated amount into the sales price of their mobile
homes and will therefore have an incentive to properly maintain the
homes, which are the most visible and depreciable capital in the mobile
home park, Professor Fischel reasons.
Professor Fischel's arguments assume that there is a significant difference between the ability of mobile home park tenants to capitalize the
benefits of rent control and the ability of tenants of other forms of housing to do so. But there are a number of ways in which tenants in stickbuilt housing can capture part of the value of rent control. Although
jurisdictions typically either forbid a tenant in a rent controlled apartment from subletting or limit the rent such a tenant could charge a sublessee,' 7 tenants can and do evade the restrictions, which are quite
difficult to enforce except in owner-occupied buildings. If there are no
vacancy decontrols, tenants can charge "key money" to potential successor tenants; if there is such decontrol, tenants can seek money from owners for the act of leaving.' 8 Tenants who leave the apartment or die can
17. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. tit.26, ch.4, § 26-51 l(c)(12)
(1992) (permitting tenants in rent stabilized units to sublet for not more than two years in a four-year
period, but forbidding the tenant from charging the subtenant more than the stabilized rent, with
exceptions for apartments furnished by the tenant).
18. Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel G. Hirsch, Legal - Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a
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make the apartments available to family members or spousal equivalents,
for either monetary or psychological compensation.' 9 Indeed, tenants
have been known to use the value of the rent controlled apartment as one
of their main contributions to a divorce settlement. 20 The ability to sublet or charge "key money" provides an incentive for tenants to maintain
their units (and to a much more limited degree, to maintain common
areas), 2' just as the ability to capitalize rent control's value into the price
of a mobile home provides such an incentive.
Professor Fischel argues that the third inefficiency, conversion of
units to non-regulated uses, is less of a problem in mobile home parks
because the owner of a mobile home park cannot occupy the mobile
home himself or herself, as a landlord can do with a rent-controlled
apartment. That distinction is correct, although whether the distinction
amounts to a significant difference depends upon the nature of the market for rent controlled apartments. A landlord can occupy only a limited
number of apartments under the personal use exception. In a town
where many rent-controlled landlords own only one or two rental units
each, then, the comparative efficiency of mobile home park rent control
on this score might be significant; in a city like New York, where units
containing fewer than six apartments are not covered by rent control, it
would be much less significant.
The fourth problem, tenants who overstay, is less of a problem in
mobile home parks, Professor Fischel argues, because owners of mobile
homes can capitalize the benefits of rent control into their sales price
whenever they leave. Again, Professor Fischel underestimates the degree
to which tenants in apartments are able to capture the benefits of rent
control without remaining in possession, through subletting, succession
rights, "key money," and vacancy payments.

Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. REV. 399, 425 n.87
(1988).
19. For discussions of the value of succession rights see Bradley L. Steere & Lisa A. Pieroni,
Note, The Broadening of Succession Rights: Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 33,
34-36 (1989); S. Emily Pouland, Note, The Question of Succession in New York City: Who Has the
Right to Renew A Rent-Stablilized Lease, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1852-54 (1988); Lawrence A.

Kanusher, Note, All in the Family: Succession Rights and Rent Stabilized Apartments, 53 BROOK. L.
REV. 213, 215-18 (1987).

20. Andrea Brooks, Whose Apartment After the Breakup?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1985, § 8, at 1.
21. It may be that tenants assume some of the burdens of maintenance even in the absence of
capitalization. See Edgar 0. Olsen, What Do Economists Know About the Effect of Rent Control on
Housing Maintenance?, 1 J. REAL EST. FIN. EcON. 295 (1988).
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COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY AS A PREDICTOR OF
THE POLITICAL PROCESS

But even if mobile home park rent controls are comparatively more
efficient than regular rent control, the question then becomes whether
that comparative efficiency renders mobile home park owners unable to
ally with other voters and thereby "protect themselves politically by coalitions and vote trading."' 22 Professor Fischel contends that no one
other than mobile home park owners is burdened by rent control, 23 so
owners will have no allies, while regular rent control burdens so many
different groups that landlords will have allies.
Professor Fischel's claim is puzzling. He admits that mobile home
rent control is not perfectly efficient, so it must impose some costs upon
groups other than owners, just as regular rent control does. An examination of who bears the burden of the various inefficiencies of mobile home
rent control reveals that the types of people who bear those burdens are
the same as those that bear the burden of regular rent control. 24 The
difference between the two versions of rent control, then, is in the
amount of the cost imposed, not in the nature of the groups who bear
those costs. Yet Professor Fischel offers no evidence that the amount of
the cost imposed is below the threshold required to motivate those burdened to take political action.
Indeed, his anecdotal evidence regarding the "political isolation" of
mobile home park owners shows that the existence of political allies
seems to have little to do with the incidence or extent of the costs imposed by mobile home rent control versus regular rent control. Professor
Fischel's description of the politics of rent control on the state level completely ignores the relative abilities of mobile home park owners and
22. Fischel, supra note 1, at 898.
23. Id. at 893.
24. When a landlord reduces the maintenance that s/he provides a rent controlled apartment,
for example, the groups who suffer are the current tenants, who either pay more themselves for
maintenance or accept lower quality services; the future tenants, who also either pay more themselves to bring the apartment up to their standards and keep it there or accept lower quality; neighbors who suffer the externalities caused by decrepit property, and taxpayers who have to make up for
the reduction in taxes the property in question must pay as a result of the reduction in its value. If a
mobile home park is undermaintained as a result of rent control, the costs of the undermaintenance
will fall on those same categories of people. Even if mobile home park rent control will result in less
under-maintenance than regular rent control, as Professor Fischel argues, there will still be some
under-maintenance, and that under-maintenance will give the park owner the same potential political allies as the landlord. The only difference will be that those potential allies will have been hurt
less by mobile home park rent control than by regular rent control.
The other inefficiencies of mobile home rent control also fall upon the same types of people as
the inefficiencies of regular rent control. The burden of under-investment and overstaying falls on
future renters and home buyers. The burden of conversion falls on current tenants, future renters
and home buyers.
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landlords to secure allies among those burdened by the two forms of rent
control-we hear nothing about alliances with the property taxpayers or
neighbors hurt by the undermaintenance, or the future tenants and
homebuyers hurt by undermaintenance and disinvestment, for example.
Instead, Professor Fischel reports that mobile home park owners were
unable to ally with owners and developers of other forms of housing because those other owners and developers had an interest in putting mobile home parks at a competitive disadvantage. That would be true even
if mobile home rent control were every bit as inefficient as regular rent
control.
The most telling aspect of Professor Fischel's report is his revelation
that despite the supposed comparative inefficiency of regular rent control, landlords had no more success than mobilehome park owners in
putting together a coalition to secure statewide legislation prohibiting
rent control. 25 The revelation illustrates that even if comparative efficiency were a good predictor of the number of potential allies a burdened
group has, that number tells us little about whether the political process
will correct the unfairness of the regulation.
Professor Fischel seems to have two kinds of political "correction"
in mind. First, the unfairness could be corrected if those hurt by this
regulation can recoup their losses through some other regulation, and
thereby secure an "average reciprocity of advantage." Second, the unfairness could be corrected if those hurt are able to get the regulation
repealed or are otherwise able to escape the force of the regulation. Both
forms of correction depend on much more than whether those hurt by a
regulation-the property owner and his or her allies-constitute a
majority.
As public choice theory tells us, corrective political action depends
as well upon such factors as the intensity of people's preferences; the
relative abilities of the allies and opponents to organize (as Professor Fischel's description of the superior ability of mobile home tenants to form
an effective lobbying organization illustrates); the relative ability of the
allies and opponents to logroll; the degree to which a jurisdiction's politicians campaign, and therefore need campaign funds; the extent to which
the influence model rather than the majoritarian model holds in a particular jurisdiction; and the extent to which a jurisdiction's decisions can be
overturned by higher levels of government.
25. Professor Fischel discloses in a footnote that mobile home park owners were successful in
getting a law passed to disallow rent control on new mobile home parks. Fischel, supra note 1, at
875 n.33.
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Professor Fischel ignores those variables by treating all local governments as majoritarian political animals. Just reading the various papers
presented at this conference reveals, however, that there is enormous
room for debate about whether all or even most local governments fit
that model. Perhaps it is an accurate description of small suburban governments, but it certainly doesn't capture the complexities of the politics
of the major cities that account for most of the rent controlled units.
Confronting such variables is critical to assessing whether the political process will correct unfairness. Efficiency tells us little or nothing
about them, however, and therefore can't serve as a proxy for the potential for political correction. That is brought home quite forcefully by the
fact that regular rent control, which is Professor Fischel's model for a
comparatively inefficient regulation that imposes costs upon so many different groups that it is likely to be corrected in the political process, has
stubbornly persisted, long after it could be valued as what Professor Fischel refers to as "an educational device." Hirsch & Hirsch's study of
mobile home rent control in California, on the other hand, points to several instances in which mobile home rent control has been repealed, both
26
by legislative action and by initiative.
What might be better proxies?
Luckily, we don't need efficiency to serve as a proxy for the corrective potential of the political process, because we can look at much more
direct measures-the opportunities those affected by a regulation have
for exit and voice. My Columbia article 27 took that tack in analyzing
whether developers' ability to exit was sufficient to constrain local governments' exactions policies. The article noted that a similar inquiry
should be made regarding developers' voice options, but didn't tackle
that issue. Professor Fischel is skeptical of my conclusion that sufficient
exit options do exist, because he believes that landowners, who are
locked into the jurisdiction by the immobility of the land, are likely to
bear the costs of exactions. I agree that landowners by themselves have
insufficient exit options to affect local governments' exactions policies, so
the difference between us boils down to an empirical question about the
extent to which the incidence of exactions falls on landowners rather
than developers or the ultimate homebuyers. The evidence regarding
who actually bears the costs of exactions is sparse, but economic theory
suggests that the most likely scenario is one in which the landowner,
26. Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 18, at 408-11.
27. Been, supra note 7.
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homebuyer and developer share the costs of the exaction. 28 In that case,
my article shows that the developer's bargaining power will provide indi29
rect protection for the landowner.
In any event, what is important here is the comparative efficiency of
focusing on efficiency, rather than exit and voice, to assess whether the
courts need to step in to protect property owners against the tyranny of
the majority. Let me suggest a few reasons why exit and voice are more
helpful in that assessment.
First, the availability of exit options is fairly easily and objectively
determined. There is little doubt that mobile home park owners have few
avenues for exit, for example, even though one can argue about the comparative efficiencies of regular rent control and mobile home park rent
control.
Second, we have models for evaluating when a certain quantum of
exit options is enough to regulate local governments, by using what economists have learned in measuring the competitiveness of various markets.
We also have models for examining when voice options are sufficient,
because we can use as a benchmark the characteristics that render certain
groups the paradigm of a discrete and insular minority.
Third, if we focus on efficiency, it would be all too easy to evaluate
the efficiency of a regulation purely by applying economic theory, without taking into account the differences that specific markets might make
to the comparative efficiency of a regulation. In a small bedroom suburb,
for example, homeowners may be no more likely to ally with landlords
than with park owners because there are few rental units in the tax base
and because homeowners would prefer to limit the number of apartments
in town. The potential for error is high unless such a case by case analysis is performed. To look at exit and voice, on the other hand, we would
be forced to examine the characteristics of the particular political
processes of each of the comparatively few types of local government. I
don't mean that we should fall prey to lumping New York City under the
same local government heading as a small exclusive suburb, but we can
identify the handful of different types of jurisdictions and make a broader
determination than a case by case analysis.
Finally, by looking at voice and exit we can discern useful information about how courts can assure a political process that better protects
against majoritarian excess. If we see, for example, that exit and voice
options are not available to landlords in communities like Santa Monica,
28. Been, supra note 7, at 540-41.
29. Id. at 540-42.
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the best remedy might be to give landlords more voice, by requiring, let's
say, that decisions about rent control be made by higher levels of
government.
These suggestions are not meant to discount the myriad of difficulties that would attend a thorough examination of the exit and voice options of those subject to regulations. Ultimately, however, those
difficulties are likely to be much less serious than those which attend the
use of efficiency as a proxy for the corrective potential of the political
process. Professor Fischel has moved us forward by showing why the
takings inquiry should focus on the potential for the political process to
correct unfairness. But the tool he offers for evaluating that potential is
flawed.

